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ABSTRACT:
 
 
 
This essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to
Parfit’s attempt in 
 
Reasons and Persons
 
 to connect his theory of personal identity
to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit’s critics have tried to
sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invok-
ing the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal
identity, we still have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliber-
ating about what to do. The argument between Parfit and his opponents illuminates
broader questions about the relationship between our metaphysical beliefs and our
practical reasons.
 
 
 
RÉSUMÉ : Cet article examine et critique un ensemble d’objections kantiennes à
la tentative de Parfit, dans 
 
Reasons and Persons
 
, d’ajuster sa théorie de l’identité
personnelle à la rationalité pratique et à la philosophie morale. Plusieurs des cri-
tiques de Parfit ont essayé de rompre le lien qu’il tisse entre ses conclusions méta-
physiques et pratiques en évoquant l’idée kantienne selon laquelle, même si nous
acceptons sa théorie métaphysique de l’identité personnelle, il existe cependant de
bonnes raisons pratiques de rejeter cette théorie lorsque nous délibérons à propos de
ce que nous devons faire. Le débat entre Parfit et ses adversaires nous éclaire sur un
questionnement plus large à propos du rapport entre croyance métaphysique et rai-
son pratique.
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In 
 
Reasons and Persons
 
 Derek Parfit raises important questions about the
relationship between our metaphysical beliefs and our practical reasons
by exploring the consequences of  his reductionist theory of  personal iden-
tity for ethics and rational choice. Near the end of  
 
Reasons and Persons
 
 it
becomes clear that one of  Parfit’s central concerns is to challenge John
Rawls’s influential claim in
 
 A Theory of Justice
 
 that utilitarianism is an
implausible moral theory because it makes a metaphysical mistake: in its
concern to maximize the aggregate utility of  persons, it fallaciously
applies individual maximizing rationality to groups of  distinct persons
(Rawls 1999, pp. 25-26). In effect, Rawls suggests that the fatal flaw of  util-
itarianism is not its counter-intuitive ethical consequences, but rather the
fact that it ignores a deep metaphysical distinction between persons. In
contrast, Parfit thinks that once we accept his reductionist theory of  per-
sonal identity, the boundaries we erect between ourselves and others will
begin to crumble, thus increasing our willingness to endorse impersonal,
utilitarian moral principles: “the Utilitarian View may be supported by,
not the conflation of  persons, but their partial disintegration” (Parfit
1984, p. 336).
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Rather than address Parfit’s views on utilitarianism, I shall defend his
more general assumption that theoretical insights about personal identity
may legitimately alter either the substance or scope of  our practical rea-
sons. My argument takes a conditional form: if  we accept Parfit’s theory
of  personal identity, then we are committed to certain practical conse-
quences. In order to substantiate the antecedent, I begin with a brief  over-
view of  Parfit’s reductionist view of  personal identity and his consequent
view that what matters in survival is not numerical identity but rather the
persistence of  certain physical and psychological relations. I then begin
the main task of  the article. The goal is to defend Parfit from a pair of  crit-
ics—both of  whom acknowledge some debt to Kant—who think we can
accept Parfit’s metaphysics while blocking the practical inferences he
wishes to draw. Both critics exploit the Kantian belief  that we may view a
particular event from either a practical standpoint or a theoretical stand-
point, and arrive at two different yet equally legitimate conclusions.
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Although I refer to such views as “Kantian,” I make no attempt to inter-
pret Kant’s writings on personal identity.
 
1. Debunking the “Standard View”
 
According to what Parfit calls the “standard view,” persons are physical
objects of  a certain sort, and personal identity just consists in a particular
person tracing a unique spatio-temporal path. On Parfit’s reductionist
view, by contrast, since persons are best described in psychological, rather
than physical terms, the main ingredient of  personal identity is the persist-
ence of  certain psychological relations over time.
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  Parfit thinks physical
relations are important to personal identity only to the extent that a phys-
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ical medium is necessary to support the kinds of  mental events that com-
prise persons.
Parfit devises a series of  thought experiments to cast doubt on the stand-
ard view. In one of  his more familiar thought experiments, 
 
The Branch-
Line Case
 
, we are asked to imagine the advent of  Star Trek-style transpor-
tation. A “Teletransporter” would scan and record your mental and phys-
ical state at a particular time—including the positions and interrelations
of  all your brain and body cells—and then use this information to trans-
port you somewhere else by re-creating your body and brain out of  new
material. The Teletransporter would then either destroy your original
body or else preserve it. If  the original were destroyed, Parfit says, many
people after careful consideration would be inclined to call the replica 
 
dif-
ferent
 
 from the original body but 
 
identical
 
 to the original person:
although it is composed of  fresh atoms, the replica is qualitatively identi-
cal to and psychologically continuous with the original person. Someone
contemplating whether to Teletransport might thus anticipate travel
rather than death. If, however, the standard view of  personal identity were
correct, we should anticipate death rather than travel, since the spatio-
temporal path of  the person in question is interrupted. Thus, if  the stand-
ard view of  persons were correct, the advent of  Teletransportation would
amount to a new way of  committing suicide, rather than a new way of
travelling.
The assumptions underlying the very idea of  Teletransportation are not
trivial. It is first assumed that persons are connected with but conceptu-
ally distinct from their bodies (though not in the way Descartes believed).
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But it is also assumed that the medium in which a particular person is
instantiated can be altered or even replicated while preserving the psycho-
logical relations Parfit considers crucial to survival. Both assumptions
may be doubted (though I shall not defend them here, since my main
objective is to explore the practical consequences of  Parfit’s view). More-
over, even if  each assumption is granted, the pair of  assumptions may
seem inconsistent: if  we manipulate or duplicate the medium, we appar-
ently alter the person who goes with it. But this does not follow. If  a person
fundamentally 
 
is
 
 certain kinds of  psychological relations, and if  we can
conceive of  psychological relations as dependent upon but distinct from
the physical medium which supports them, then we can coherently imag-
ine the possibility of  scanning and copying a functioning brain so that its
memories, beliefs, etc. are recorded and then re-instantiated in a new
medium. 
 
2. Continuity and Connectedness
 
If  we consider a case of  Teletransportation in which both the replica and
the original person survive, we immediately face a conceptual problem for
personal identity. Although both survivors are exactly like the person
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scanned, only one of  them can be 
 
numerically
 
 identical to the original per-
son. This kind of  case suggests that what fundamentally matters in sur-
vival is not numerical identity, but rather the persistence of  certain
psychological traits that we care about. Parfit distinguishes two kinds of
psychological relation that he thinks fundamentally matter in questions
of  survival: connectedness and continuity. 
 
Psychological Connectedness
 
 is the holding of  particular direct psycho-
logical connections.
 
Psychological Continuity
 
 is the holding of  overlapping chains of  strong
connectedness.
Examples of  a 
 
psychological
 
 
 
connection
 
 between person P at one time and
person P' at a later time are an 
 
intention
 
 that is formed by P and then car-
ried out by P', an 
 
experience
 
 had by P and then remembered by P', and
certain distinctive desires and beliefs integral to the psychological make-
up of  P which persist in P'. It is important to understand that for Parfit a
particular psychological connection—such as the intention I recently
formed to write this article, and the current fulfillment of  that intention—
either holds or does not hold.
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 Thus, although Parfit confusingly says that
psychological connectedness “admits of  degrees” and can be “strong” or
“weak” (1984, pp. 206, 304), he does not mean that some particular expe-
rience memories, for example, are more vivid than others, but rather that
the number of  connections between P and P' may be greater or lesser. To
use a rope rather than a chain metaphor, the “strength” of  a Parfitian rope
of connectedness does not refer to the quality of  thread it contains, but
instead to the number of  intertwining strings which comprise it. 
Psychological continuity consists in “overlapping chains” of  strong
connectedness in the way in which the strands in a rope mesh together
(ibid., p. 222). If  many distinct psychological connections hold between
person P at t
 
1
 
 and P' at t
 
2
 
, then P' is 
 
continuous with
 
 P. If  we imagine a sin-
gle strand which ties a particular memory had by P' to an earlier action of
P, then P and P' exhibit some 
 
connectedness
 
 but not necessarily any 
 
conti-
nuity
 
. If  many strings of  experiences and subsequent memories of  those
experiences bind P to P', or many strings of  beliefs and desires persist
between P and P', then P and P' are 
 
psychologically
 
 
 
continuous
 
 with one
another. 
Psychological connectedness and continuity jointly constitute what
Parfit calls “Relation R.”
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 According to Parfit, Relation R is what matters
in survival. The only difference between personal identity (“PI”) and a full
realization of  Relation R (“R”) is that personal identity (
 
qua
 
 numeric
identity) implies Uniqueness (“U”). More schematically, on Parfit’s reduc-
tionist view of  personal identity, PI = R + U. In most cases, U has no
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intrinsic importance (unless you have a special attachment to the particu-
lar atoms that currently make up your body and brain). Thus, on Parfit’s
reductionist view, what matters in survival is that the maximum degree of
R obtains between P and P'. 
 
3. Persons and Reasons
 
If, as Parfit says, the standard view of  personal identity is both widely
believed and false, this would apparently have far-reaching consequences
for our practical reasons and moral commitments. For example, if  my ini-
tial reason for setting aside money for retirement depends on the assump-
tion that I will be identical to the retired person with my name, and if  I
subsequently discover that I will eventually have little if  any psychological
continuity with that future person, my original reason seems to vanish. It
might also seem that if  we can expect diminishing psychological continu-
ity over time, we would have less reason to draw a sharp distinction
between our own future welfare and the welfare of  others in the future.
According to some commentators on an earlier work (Parfit 1973),
Parfit suggests that “considerations about the nature of  personal identity
may provide some support for utilitarianism” (Scheffler 1982, p. 231).
This is true but misleading. Parfit does think a reductionist view of  PI may
help defeat certain objections to utilitarianism and that it may help
explain why some people accept utilitarianism. He does not, however,
claim that reductionism suffices to justify any particular moral view.
Other commentators suggest that since Parfit thinks of  personal identity
in terms of  Relation R, he is committed to the claim that “we should iden-
tify with and care about ourselves and each other [only] to the degree to
which our parts are connected by Relation R” (Wolf  1986, p. 710). In fact,
however, Parfit thinks reductionism has more modest practical conse-
quences. First, he claims that “it can be rational to care less [about my
own future] when one of  the grounds for caring will hold to a lesser
degree” (1984, p. 313). If  my special concern for my own future is
grounded in Relation R, then this rationally licenses, though does not
require, me to act on the basis of  “R-variant” concern. As Parfit puts it,
“my concern for my future may correspond to the degree of  [R] between
me now and myself  in the future” (ibid.).
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Parfit also suggests that we may take similar attitudes toward other peo-
ple: we may justifiably adjust our attitudes toward others to account for
diminishing degrees of  Relation R. For example, my previous special con-
cern for my primary schoolmates may reasonably decline as we “grow
apart” or become less R-related to our earlier selves. For similar reasons,
Parfit thinks we may rationally change our attitudes toward malefactors
and promise-breakers: “Reduced psychological connectedness would
reduce both responsibility for past crimes, and obligations to fulfill past
commitments” (ibid., p. 446).
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4. Korsgaard on Metaphysical Theories and Practical Reasons
 
Christine Korsgaard denies that Parfit’s reductionist view of  personal
identity has any practical consequences. Her grounds are broadly Kant-
ian, and her strategy is to provisionally accept Parfit’s view of  PI as a
metaphysical theory but to deny its alleged implications for rational
choice. She begins by conceding that “Parfit has established that there is
no deep sense in which I am identical to the subject of  experiences who
will occupy my body in the future” (1989, p. 109). She then sets out to
defend her view: “I nevertheless have reasons for regarding myself  as the
same rational agent as the one who will occupy my body in the future,”
adding that “these reasons are not 
 
metaphysical
 
, but 
 
practical
 
” (ibid.,
p. 109). Ultimately, Korsgaard hopes to cleave the connection Parfit
makes between personal identity and practical reasons by undermining
the authority of  any purely metaphysical account of  PI.
Before turning to her central arguments against Parfit’s reductionist
view of  PI, I should highlight an important mistake Korsgaard makes in
interpreting Parfit’s view about the practical consequences of  reduction-
ism. She says, “Parfit assumes that my attitude about the desires of  the
future inhabitant of  my body should be based on the metaphysics of  per-
sonal identity. . . . But this argument from the metaphysical facts to nor-
mative reasons involves a move from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ which requires
justification” (1989, p. 112). In fact, Parfit makes no such assumption and
no such move. 
In discussing the practical consequences of  his reductionist view of  PI,
Parfit distinguishes two possible implications, neither of  which involves a
move from “is” to “ought.” According to the first, which he calls the
Extreme Claim, reductionism shows that we have no reason at all to be
concerned about our own futures (1984, p. 307). Only if  personal identity
were based in some further fact beyond Relation R could we have any such
reason (ibid., p. 311). The Moderate Claim, by contrast, which Parfit
favours, is that the reductionist view 
 
can
 
 justify our taking a special inter-
est in our own futures, given a sufficient degree of  Relation R (ibid.,
p. 313). The Moderate Claim does not imply that we are rationally
required to proportion concern for our future selves to the degree to which
Relation R is expected to obtain. It merely implies that Relation R 
 
may
 
play a legitimate role in deciding how much interest to take in a future self.
Nevertheless, this appears to confirm Korsgaard’s accusation: Parfit
moves from a factual claim about personal identity to a normative claim
about rational choice. But this is not quite right. Parfit’s move is better
seen as a metaphysical adjustment to the 
 
scope
 
 of  foregone practical rea-
sons. 
Assuming with Parfit that we each have reason to act in ways that pro-
mote our own good, a proponent of  the “standard” or non-reductionist
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view of  personal identity might claim that we ought to act in ways that are
neutral between promoting our own good now and our own good in the
future. The Extreme Claim simply suggests that since the standard view is
false, we have no special reason to care about our future, while the Mod-
erate Claim suggests that since the standard view is false, we might ground
concern for future selves in Relation R rather than personal identity.
According to Parfit, both claims are rationally defensible (ibid., p. 312).
More importantly, neither claim violates Hume’s Law—neither moves
from 
 
is
 
 to 
 
ought
 
. Since both claims take normative reasons as inputs and
transform them into (different) normative outputs, both the Extreme
Claim and the Moderate Claim move from 
 
ought
 
 to 
 
ought
 
. They differ
only in the direction in which they allow similar metaphysical facts to
channel normative reasons.
 
5. Korsgaard and the Unity of Agency over Time
 
Korsgaard gives two arguments against Parfit’s reductionist view and for
the necessary unity of  agency over time, or personal identity, both of
which appeal to the idea that personal identity is forged through practical
deliberation and action. Her first argument begins with the premise that
most of  what we care about takes time. This includes friendships, personal
projects, and careers. Korsgaard maintains that “in choosing our careers,
and pursuing our friendships and family lives, we both presuppose and
construct a continuity of  identity and of  agency” (1989, p. 113). This sug-
gests a transcendental argument, but one which concerns the precondi-
tions for certain kinds of  action rather than experience. It can be
reconstructed as follows:
(1) In order to engage in long-term relationships and pursue projects,
we must have (construct) an identity that spans a significant tract
of  time.
(2) We have such relationships and pursue such projects.
 
---
 
∴
 
---
 
(3) We must have (construct) an identity that spans a significant tract
of  time.
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The argument is deductively valid, but either unsound or impotent,
depending on how we interpret its premises. Beginning with the second
premise, it is noteworthy that personal identity theorists find marginal
and counterfactual cases significant precisely because they do not con-
form to the normal pattern “we” exhibit. Premise (2), however, ignores
these cases. Moreover, it ignores the familiar fact that projects and friend-
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ships can be interrupted by personality changes or life circumstances
beyond our control. Nonetheless, premise (2) is true as an empirical
description of  most people most of  the time. Premise (1), meanwhile,
seems to be a conceptual platitude about relationships and projects.
Let us, then, provisionally grant both premises in order to focus on the
conclusion Korsgaard draws from the argument. Korsgaard takes the
conclusion to show that personal identity spans a normal human life
span—that “you are one continuing person because you have one life to
lead” (1989, p. 113). Yet the argument she suggests above cannot generate
this result. This is because premise (1) is plausible only if  “significant tract
of  time” is taken to mean less than or equal to a normal biological life
span. After all, a meaningful relationship can exist over several months or
years, and a rewarding project can span a few weeks. Neither relationships
nor projects necessarily last indefinitely long, nor do we always intend
them to. Even when they do last much of  one’s life, they may persist in the
face of  significant changes to those involved. The pursuit of  projects and
persistence of  friendships requires some degree of  continuity in the people
involved, but it does not require that the content of  the project or the
nature of  the persons involved remain identical over time.
Thus, if  Korsgaard’s premises are interpreted in a plausible way, her
argument does not show anything about personal identity in unusual
cases or over long tracts of  time. It only shows that having relationships
and pursuing projects takes time. To this extent, it is compatible with
Parfit’s view. If, however, it is supposed to show (as she suggests) that
projects and friendships are the glue that bind together the temporal
stages of  an entire human life, then it is not only incompatible with Parfit’s
view, but it rests on the false assumption that friendships and projects can-
not exist unless they span an entire lifetime. 
In her second argument for the necessary unity of  agency over time,
Korsgaard supposes for the sake of  argument that a succession of  rational
agents occupies her body (ibid., p. 113).
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 In this case, she claims, each
agent will need to cooperate with other temporally separated agents in
order to advance their own ends—a sort of  diachronic, intrapersonal ver-
sion of  Hobbesian contractualism. Given a shared desire to advance their
own ends, each self  in a string of  selves ought to engage in mutually ben-
eficial cooperation (much like Hobbesian agents ought to act in ways that
bring about mutual benefit through social stability). Korsgaard quickly
realizes that the analogy is strained. Although a current self  might benefit
a past self  by carrying out its plans, it has no reason to do so if  the plans
are inimical to its current interests. Moreover, on the assumption that
selves are discrete entities, there is no reason for a current self  to ensure
the well-being of  a future self  that does not yet exist, for, if  her grounds
for helping a future self  were for mutual benefit, she would be committed
 Personal Identity and Practical Reason
 
339
 
to an erroneous belief  in backward causation—helping a future self  in the
expectation of  some current benefit. 
Perhaps a similar insight leads Korsgaard to refine her second argu-
ment. Even on the assumption that your body is occupied by successive
selves, Korsgaard claims, “your present self  must identify with something
from which you will derive your reasons, but not necessarily with some-
thing present” (ibid., p. 113). For any “deliberative choice” or plan you
make concerning your future, that plan will very likely “carry” you some
distance into the future. Your present self  must identify some future self—
which it regards as identical with its current self—as the future beneficiary
or executor of  a current plan (ibid.). 
With this conceptual claim I have no quarrel. But it is not clear how it
damages Parfit’s reductionist view of  personal identity. Korsgaard is cor-
rect that practical deliberation or planning always concerns future events,
and that forming and executing plans involves the presumption of  identity
(or at least a high degree of  Relation R) between the person who formed
the plan and the future person deciding whether to execute it. But she
erroneously concludes from this claim that we must in fact be unified
agents over indefinitely long tracts of  time. This is wrong for two reasons.
First, as Korsgaard would agree, merely forming a plan does not guaran-
tee that it will be carried out. Our plans might change or the world might
prevent us from carrying them out. Second, and more importantly, even
if  plans are carried out in the future, the reductionist view does not imply
that cooperation and consequent unification of  successive selves has taken
place. This is because, even on the reductionist view, it does not follow
from the fact that the plans of  a self  at t
 
1
 
 are carried out at some point in
the future t
 
2
 
 that the self  which carries out the plan is a different future
self. Selves are not necessarily so transitory, except on the most extreme
reductionist view of  personal identity. Parfit accordingly warns that “talk
about successive selves can easily be misunderstood, or taken too liter-
ally. [This way of  talking] is suited only for cases where there is some
sharp discontinuity, marking the boundary between two successive
selves” (Korsgaard 1989, p. 306). So the modified version of  Korsgaard’s
second argument can only derail an extreme reductionist view that seeks
to show that each ordinary person is merely a long series of  temporally
distinct selves with little if  any relation to each other. And this view is
indeed implausible. Let us nevertheless grant Korsgaard’s second argu-
ment against Parfit’s reductionist view and see what follows.
Korsgaard claims the upshot of  her argument is that “there is a neces-
sary connection between agency and unity which requires no metaphysi-
cal support” (ibid., p. 115). To justify this anti-reductionist conclusion,
Korsgaard invokes the Kantian thought that we may think about human
agency and personal identity from either of  two legitimate standpoints.
According to Korsgaard, the theoretical standpoint suggests that we are
-
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mere bundles of  psychological phenomena which become less connected
over time. But from the practical standpoint we rightly see ourselves as uni-
fied agents over time. Korsgaard explicates her use of  the two-standpoints
strategy with an analogy between the problem of  personal identity and the
problem of  free will:
 
We may regard ourselves as objects of  theoretical understanding, natural phe-
nomena whose behavior may be causally explained and predicted like any
other. Or we may regard ourselves as agents, as the thinkers of  our thoughts
and the originators of  our actions. . . . As objects of  theoretical study, we see
ourselves as wholly determined by natural forces, the mere undergoers of  our
experiences. Yet as agents, we view ourselves as free and responsible, as the
authors of  our actions and the 
 
leaders
 
 of  our lives. The incongruity need not
become contradiction, so long as we keep in mind that the two views of  our-
selves spring from two different relations in which we stand to our actions. . . .
These two relations are 
 
equally legitimate
 
, inescapable, and governed by reason,
but they are separate. (1989, p. 120; emphasis added)
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 Korsgaard’s analogy between how we might view our actions (
 
qua
 
 free vs.
determined) and how we might view the unity of  our lives over time (
 
qua
 
reducible to psychological phenomena vs. unified) is entirely appropriate.
From the inside, or the deliberative standpoint, we certainly seem to make
free choices and live a single, unified life. But might this appearance be
deceptive? 
 
6. Korsgaard’s Compatibilism
 
Korsgaard argues that taking a practical, deliberative view of  ourselves is
“equally legitimate” to taking a theoretical, explanatory view: the facts
that each standpoint reveals are equally facts. This compatibilist view of
personal identity is intuitively plausible, but it faces significant epistemo-
logical problems. The first problem is that it implies that a particular
person-stage can be given contradictory descriptions, both of  which are
equally true. To illustrate the problem, let us define “p” as the proposition
that Pablo Picasso at age seventy-five is identical with Pablo Picasso at age
twenty-five. Korsgaard’s compatibilism implies that from the practical
standpoint “p” may be true despite the fact that from the theoretical
standpoint “~p” is true. Thus, “p & ~p” are compatible—Picasso at age
seventy-five both 
 
is
 
 and 
 
is not
 
 identical to Picasso at age twenty-five.
In Korsgaard’s defence, we might avoid inconsistency in simultaneously
believing “p & ~p” by appropriately relativizing truth claims. One way of
doing so is to claim that when we deliberate practically, we discover that p is
true, but when we deliberate theoretically, we find that ~p is true. If so, “p &
~p” may be simultaneously true. But this is a pyrrhic victory. If truth is
merely perspectival—i.e., relative to one of two equally legitimate stand-
 Personal Identity and Practical Reason
 
341
 
points which we may occupy—then we can never describe either ourselves or
the world as they really are. Although this version of the “two-standpoints”
argument is coherent, it dogmatically limits the pretension of  our theories.
It implies that our ideas about biology and chemistry, for instance, are
deeply dependent on the standpoint we take. Worse still, perspectivism
cannot hope for a ground-level justification, since its truth precludes us
from making non-perspectival claims. An opponent of  this version of  the
two-standpoints strategy need not assume that we can certainly describe
the world as it really is. He need only reserve the metaphysical right to
try—a right which perspectivism forbids us from exercising.
A more compelling way for Korsgaard to countenance inconsistent
beliefs generated by the two-standpoints argument is to distinguish the
justificatory standards of  practical beliefs from those of  theoretical
beliefs. If  it is theoretically rational to believe p, but practically rational to
believe ~p, then perhaps the belief  set “p & ~p” can be justified. To see
how, consider the following distinction: 
(1) p is the rational thing to believe.
(2) believing p is the rational thing to do.
Robert Nozick illustrates the distinction with the case of  a doting mother
presented with courtroom evidence that her son has committed a terrible
crime.
 
11
 
 Nozick suggests that although concluding that her son is guilty
may be the rational thing for her to believe, denying his guilt or abstaining
from forming an opinion on the subject (if  this is psychologically possible)
may be the rational thing for her to do. This is so if  her practical goal of
avoiding deeply painful beliefs outweighs her theoretical goal of  increas-
ing her share of  justified beliefs.
 
12
 
 
According to the present proposal, Korsgaard faces a similar choice in
theorizing about personal identity. If  her justificatory standards for
hypotheses about personal identity are sometimes theoretical and some-
times practical—as the two-standpoints strategy suggests—then perhaps
her different conclusions are mutually consistent as long as she holds
them at different times and for different reasons. She may justifiably
believe p under certain conditions, and ~p under other conditions.
 
13
 
 But,
if  so, her conclusions are also apparently consistent with the practical con-
sequences Parfit draws from his theory of  personal identity (see §3 above).
By provisionally accepting Parfit’s theoretical conclusions at the outset,
Korsgaard unwittingly fortifies Parfit’s metaphysical theory of  personal
identity from her two-standpoints attack. If  there exists a stark distinction
between standards for rational belief  and rational action, Korsgaard’s
best response is that people sufficiently bothered by Parfit’s reductionist
view should try to ignore it when deciding how to act.
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 This, however, is
 342
 
Dialogue
 
a far cry from showing that it is not an accurate depiction of  personal
identity, or that, even if  it is, it has no practical consequences. 
Korsgaard concludes her critique of  Parfit the same way she begins it:
by reminding us that “we think of  living our lives, and even of  having our
experiences, as something that we 
 
do
 
. And it is this important feature of
our sense of  our identity that Parfit’s account leaves out” (1989, p. 121).
Yet Parfit leaves this out only in the content of  a metaphysical description
of personal identity. He understands the common conviction that we have
our experiences and that we are identical to all non-branching person-
stages with whom we share a body.
 
15
 
 But it is precisely these phenomenal
convictions that Parfit holds up to scrutiny. We cannot undermine his
reductionist view by reminding him what the standard view of  personal
identity actually is, or by informing him that, from a certain perspective
or under certain conditions, we cannot help but believe it.
 
7. Has Hume Refuted Blackburn?
 
 ’Tis certain there is no question in philosophy more abstruse
than that concerning identity. . . . We must have recourse to the
most profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it. 
Hume, 
 
Treatise
 
 I.2.6
 
Perhaps the most surprising philosopher to criticize Parfit’s theory of  per-
sonal identity on broadly Kantian grounds is one of  Hume’s greatest
allies—Simon Blackburn (1997). Blackburn initially construes the prob-
lem of  personal identity as the problem of  reconciling the apparently
inconsistent conclusions generated by thinking about persons from a first-
person or practical standpoint, on the one hand, and a third-person or
theoretical standpoint, on the other. Blackburn focuses on what he calls
“the unity reaction,” which reflects the conviction that no matter how
cases involving severe psychological discontinuity are described from the
outside (or theoretically), each resulting stream of  consciousness would
experience itself  as a unified agent from the inside. The unity reaction is a
necessary feature of  conscious life. Consequently, Blackburn thinks, “even
if  Parfit’s metaphysics survives, its ethical consequences are less than he
imagines” (ibid., p. 183). 
Blackburn echoes Korsgaard’s emphasis on viewing problems of  per-
sonal identity from the practical point of  view: “what I want to propose
is that a certain kind of  activity, with a consequent purely formal unity of
the self, is involved in any kind of  practical reasoning” (ibid.). According
to Blackburn, when we reason practically, we regard ourselves as unified
agents, and this self-conception always induces us to give definitive
answers one way or another to Parfit’s thought experiments. Even if  our
metaphysics leads us to believe that survival can come in degrees, we are
under a practical “compulsion” to regard our identity as determinate, and
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this compulsion “entirely survives the awareness that the empirical self
will have dissolved or merged or split in the cases set up” (ibid.).
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Blackburn’s argument for the unity of  agency over time hinges on a
straightforward empirical claim. He believes it is a psychological fact
about creatures like ourselves that, when thinking about the future, we
regard ourselves at each stage of  the future as identical. That is, at each
stage along the spatio-temporal path our body traces, we necessarily con-
sider ourselves identical to all previous and future stages. According to
Blackburn, when we deliberate about the future we cannot think of  our-
selves as merely more or less related to the person we once were or the per-
son we anticipate becoming. 
This claim is falsifiable, and we only need a single counter-example to
falsify it. Consider someone who is diagnosed with a degenerative brain
disease, such as Alzheimer’s. In thinking about the distant future, he may
come to accept that his future self  will bear only some degree of Relation R
to his present self. If  this is true, Blackburn’s claim that he is under a prac-
tical compulsion to think of  his identity as determinate is false.
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 Upon
careful reflection, he may not believe that he will simply be or not be that
future person. And, although it may conflict with ordinary thought, he
apparently can believe this while he deliberates on what he should do now.
To take a more mundane example, it seems undeniably true that each of
us loses some continuity with the child we used to be, and most of  us do
not believe we are psychologically identical to the child we once were.
Blackburn balks at the traditional Kantian arguments for the unity of
agency over time. For example, he rejects Peter Strawson’s attempt to
ground personal identity in the necessity of  positing a unified self  over
time for the very possibility of  experience. Blackburn considers it the
wrong strategy because it involves a third-person, theoretical approach,
which is vulnerable to the kinds of  metaphysical difficulties Parfit’s science
fiction cases raise. Our worries about personal identity, Blackburn thinks,
are practical, rather than theoretical. The trick for defending something
like the standard view of personal identity, then, is to abandon third-person
theorizing altogether (when thinking about personal identity) in favour of
a practical, first-person self-conception. Blackburn eloquently expresses
the crux of  the difference over personal identity between neo-Humeans,
such as Parfit, and neo-Kantians, such as Korsgaard:
 
If  Kant is right that the two perspectives of  agency and judgement, on the one
hand, and of  anything found in an objective, Humean or Parfitian ontology, on
the other, simply do not mix, then it will be tempting to give complete meta-
physical sovereignty to the latter, and to downgrade the former as at best a
question of  a necessary illusion somehow required for thinking of  oneself  as
other than passive. (Blackburn 1997, p. 191)
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In contrast, Blackburn continues, “the [Kantian] tendency is to allow the
reductionist metaphysics, but to try to sever it from its ethical conse-
quences” (ibid.). Blackburn reluctantly embraces this approach. Although
thinking of  Kant’s argument in terms of  two standpoints is better, Black-
burn maintains, than thinking of  it in terms of  two (ontologically dis-
tinct) worlds, problems remain. How do we reconcile the two perspectives
when they deliver inconsistent conclusions? Moreover, how can we
explain or describe the primacy of  the practical perspective without
invoking the theoretical standpoint?
 
8. Blackburn and the Primacy of the Practical
 
Despite his reservations about the two-standpoints strategy, Blackburn
ultimately accepts some version of  it, granting primacy to the practical
standpoint because it better represents our ordinary conception of  prac-
tical reasoning. According to Blackburn, Parfit’s treatment of  personal
identity as a metaphysical theory “misrepresents” the way we think of
ourselves when reasoning about what to do. Following Korsgaard, Black-
burn insists that when we deliberate, we wonder what we should think or
how we should act; we do not wait to see what we end up believing or how
we end up acting. When reasoning practically, Blackburn says, “I neces-
sarily think of  the possibilities as open”; for instance, “in wondering
whether to show my holiday slides or offer a drink, I am not wondering
how events . . . will unfold. I am wondering how to unfold them” (ibid.,
p. 193). The implication is that we can answer any interesting question
about personal identity from the practical perspective, though we can
always answer trivial questions about the degrees of  R that obtain
between successive person-stages from the theoretical perspective (ibid.,
p. 195). No matter what our theoretical beliefs are, Blackburn implies,
when we decide such things as whether we should save money, have chil-
dren, or change careers, we are always led back to viewing ourselves from
the inside. No matter what we discover about the degree to which certain
psychological connections obtain between particular person-stages at dif-
ferent times, these “external” discoveries do not affect how we answer
“internal” questions about what we ought to do. 
Although this is often true, there are at least two problems with this
claim. First, Blackburn’s contentions that we “necessarily” think of  the
possibilities as open and “necessarily” think of  our identity as determi-
nate when occupying the practical standpoint does not imply that we are
correct to conceive of  ourselves in this way.
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 If  personal identity in fact
depends upon a relation (such as R+U) that we fail to acknowledge, then
our failure to acknowledge it is irrelevant: it does not reveal a different,
practical truth. Similarly, to continue with Korsgaard’s analogy between
questions about personal identity and free will, even if  I am psychologi-
cally unable to conceive of  my will as causally determined when I occupy
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the practical standpoint, if  my will is in fact fully causally determined
(whether or not I can know this fact), then the phenomenal feeling of  free
will is beside the point.
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 My practical conviction is deeply inconsistent
with the facts. In the case of  personal identity, when our practical convic-
tion in the standard view conflicts with our theoretical beliefs about the
link between Relation R and personal identity, we are tempted—correctly,
I think—to give primacy to the theoretical conclusion. 
Unlike Blackburn, I believe this temptation reflects a deep insight rather
than a philosophical prejudice. One reason to think so is that if  we reject
the general primacy of  our theoretical conclusions, we inadvertently
undermine the authority of  the empirical and causal beliefs on which
practical deliberation depends. When we think about how to efficiently
satisfy a desire, for example, we invoke theoretical beliefs about both the
existence of  our goals and the causal means to their satisfaction. When I
ask myself  whether I ought to take the A train or the Q train to Brooklyn,
I take for granted a variety of  beliefs about the direction of  train routes,
the accuracy of  subway maps, and so on. And these beliefs are not them-
selves the outcome of  practical reasoning; they are the foundational facts
(or beliefs) on the basis of  which practical reasoning proceeds. This
implies that practical deliberation cannot rest on firm ground until we take
certain fundamental classes of  theoretical beliefs for granted. Among
these may be the psychological and metaphysical facts that comprise Rela-
tion R.
The second problem with Blackburn’s claim that we are always led back
to the standard view of  personal identity when reasoning practically is
that, like his previous argument about unified agency, it is an empirical
description of  how we respond to theoretical discoveries; as such, it is
empirically defeasible. People respond to insights about personal identity
differently. Wounds in our theoretical views can bleed into our practical
convictions.
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 And this is enough to refute Blackburn’s claim that theoret-
ical insights cannot affect practical questions about personal identity in
an interesting way. Parfit, for example, confesses that his metaphysical
beliefs about personal identity have both decreased his concern for his dis-
tant future and removed a barrier between concern for himself  and con-
cern for others: “Thinking hard about these arguments removes the glass
wall between me and others. And . . . I care less about my death [since it]
is merely the fact that, after a certain time, none of  the experiences that
will occur will be related, in certain ways, to my present experiences”
(1984, p. 282). Parfit concedes that “this is simply a report of  psycholog-
ical effects” and that “the effects on others may be different” (ibid.). 
But there are also ways in which our theoretical insights must (insofar
as we are rational) impinge upon our practical beliefs. If  we initially hold
the standard view of  personal identity, but then come to accept a psycho-
logical criterion and with it come to believe that Teletransportation is a
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form of  travel rather than suicide, then when we reason practically about
whether to take an airplane to Australia or a Teletransporter, we are 
 
cet-
eris paribus
 
 irrational to choose the plane.
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 Blackburn cannot simply
appeal to the practical standpoint in deciding whether to fly or Teletrans-
port. Theoretical beliefs may very well bear upon our choice about what
to do and how to conceptualize what each alternative involves. Thus, for
example, if  we are concerned to minimize the amount of  pain in the world,
and we discover that animals with sophisticated nervous systems are not
the automatons Descartes thought they were, but are instead sentient
creatures, this must (insofar as we are rational) affect how we treat them.
In other cases, theoretical discoveries, including alterations in our meta-
physical beliefs, delineate a range of  rationally defensible practical beliefs.
As mentioned earlier, Parfit thinks one way we might respond to the
realization that survival depends upon the degree to which Relation R
obtains between successive person-stages is to adjust our concern for our
distant future in certain ways. We might have a discount rate not merely
with respect to time, but “with respect to the weakening of  one of  the two
relations [psychological continuity] which are fundamentally what matter
[in questions about survival]” (1984, p. 314). Parfit does not think the
reductionist view entails this attitude toward future person-stages, but
that it rationally permits it, and that—for some people—the reductionist
view may help support this attitude. 
Parfit’s example of  a nineteenth-century Russian socialist provides a
vivid illustration. Parfit imagines an idealistic young man who anticipates
inheriting valuable property in the distant future. His current intention is
to distribute that land to peasants when he inherits it. But he believes that
as he ages he may develop a stronger desire to keep the land for himself.
So he decides to sign a contract to compel himself, as the person he is then,
to give up the land. He then implores his wife, “I regard my ideals as essen-
tial to me. If  I lose these ideals, I want you to think that I cease to exist. I
want you to regard your husband then, not as me, the man who asks you
for a promise, but only as his corrupted later self. Promise me that you
would not do what he asks” (ibid., p. 327). The case illustrates how as peo-
ple change, they may find past commitments or ideals—ideals which
partly constitute the self—deeply repugnant, even alien.
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Pace
 
 Black-
burn, the theoretical fact that your future self  may become alien to your
current self  may justifiably guide your decision about what to do now.
 
9. Concluding Remarks
 
Rather than defending Parfit’s endorsement of  utilitarianism as the inev-
itable outcome of  his reductionist view of  personal identity, I have
defended the thesis that our metaphysical (or, more generally, theoretical)
beliefs can rationally alter both the scope and content of  our practical rea-
sons. Korsgaard seems to think that our practical belief  in what Parfit
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dubs the “standard view” of  personal identity is compatible with Parfit’s
metaphysical theory, while Blackburn thinks we can accommodate
Parfit’s metaphysical conclusions once we recognize that all interesting
questions about personal identity remain practical. I have argued that
although both Korsgaard and Blackburn may accurately describe how
personal identity is commonly conceived, their attempts to rescue the
standard view entail conclusions that we have little reason to accept.
Korsgaard’s version of  the two-standpoints strategy either invites contra-
dictory beliefs about personal identity or leads to an objectionable form
of relativism. Blackburn, on the other hand, takes the position that all
interesting questions about personal identity are practical, rather than
metaphysical, and thereby forecloses the possibility of  incorporating the-
oretical beliefs into practical deliberation.
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Notes
 
1 Nevertheless, Bernard Williams has rightly argued (in response to an earlier
article of  Parfit’s) that even if  Parfit shows that the differences between partic-
ular persons over time can be significant, he does not show that the differences
between discrete persons at any given time are insignificant (Williams 1976a,
p. 202). And this seems to be the main worry expressed by critics of  utilitari-
anism.
2 The “two-standpoints” distinction is most clearly developed in §III of  Kant’s
 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
 
 (1997).
3 Parfit encapsulates his reductionist view of  persons as follows: “the existence
of  a person, during any period, just consists in the existence of  his brain and
body, and the thinking of  his thoughts, and the doing of  his deeds, and the
occurrence of  many other physical and mental events” (1984, p. 275). Notice
that a reductionist view of  personal identity entails a reductionist view of  per-
sons: if  personal identity over time consists in some set of  facts about physical
or psychological continuity, then personhood at a particular time must like-
wise consist in facts about physical or psychological phenomena. Although
Parfit never explicitly connects the two, his reductionist view encompasses
both persons and personal identity. 
4 Parfit thinks persons are conceptually but not ontologically distinct from the
relevant physical and mental activity that comprise them. He calls this sort of
reduction constitutive rather than eliminative: “On Constitutive Reduction-
ism, the fact of  personal identity is distinct from these facts about physical and
psychological continuity. But since it just consists in them, it is not an inde-
pendent or separately obtaining fact” (Parfit 2003, p. 299).
5 Of course, the ways in which an intention can be fulfilled may vary. The article
I now write, for example, differs somewhat in content from the article I had
originally envisaged.
6 Unlike identity, neither component of  Relation R is transitive: with memory,
for example, from the fact that Picasso at age seventy-five recalls an experience
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of  Picasso at age fifty, and Picasso at fifty recalls an experience of  Picasso at
twenty-five, we cannot conclude that Picasso at seventy-five recalls an experi-
ence of  Picasso at twenty-five. 
7 Since rational choices are made on the basis of  evidence rather than facts
about a relevant prospect, Parfit should instead argue that it can be rational
to care less about one’s future self  when one justifiably anticipates discontinu-
ity between one’s current self  and future self. This might occur, for example,
given the knowledge that one has a genetic predisposition to Alzheimer’s dis-
ease and, consequently, a high probability of  severe dementia in old age.
8 It is important to notice that Korsgaard uses “identity” here to mean person-
hood or personal identity in the colloquial sense of  that term. A large part of
her essay is concerned with the issue of  precisely what a person is. However,
her reference to continuity and time in the passage cited above signals that this
particular argument concerns personal identity over time.
9 Although this supposition is presented as a concession to Parfit, Parfit actu-
ally expresses reservation about the term “successive self” because in most
cases, he thinks, Relation R does not diminish so much that we are warranted
in talking about several discrete selves (Parfit 1984, p. 306).
10 Korsgaard reaffirms this argument in 
 
The Sources of Normativity 
 
(1996),
§3.2.2 . 
11 Nozick draws the distinction and discusses the example in 
 
The Nature of
Rationality
 
 (1993, p. 70). Parfit makes a similar distinction (1984, p. 324).
12 Nozick correctly suggests that theoretical conclusions are, in general, to be
ranked lexically prior to practical beliefs in terms of  their overall credibility
(1993, p. 87). 
13 For instance, she may justifiably believe persons persist over indefinitely long
periods of  time when deciding how to treat people, given her commitment to
friendship, but she may also justifiably believe that persons are a series of  more
or less connected selves when thinking about matters metaphysically.
14 Although this may be Korsgaard’s best response, I doubt she would actually
endorse it. Nor is it usually psychologically possible to set aside evidence that
bears on one’s central beliefs about the world. On this point, see Bernard Wil-
liams (1976b).
15 “Person-stage” is Nozick’s term, not Parfit’s, but it allows us to avoid such
awkward locutions as “one’s future self,” which falsely implies identity with
that self.
16 Notice that I have reverted to talk of  “identity” rather than “survival,” which
is the real focus here. If  PI = R+U, then the cases in question obviously do not
involve questions of  identity, but rather degrees of  survival. But since Black-
burn prefers to use “identity” in discussing Parfit’s views, I will follow him in
this section to avoid vacillating between his and Parfit’s preferred usage.
17 Parfit hints at a similar answer in considering the difficulty involved in accept-
ing the reductionist view: “since I can believe this view, I assume that others
can do so too. We 
 
can
 
 believe the truth about ourselves” (1984, p. 280). 
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18 In fact, in another context, Blackburn dismisses the “Kantian fantasy” that
we can transcend certain emotional and physical facts about ourselves in
order to create an identity: “You, when you deliberate, are what you are: a per-
son of  tangled desires, conflicting attitudes to your parents, inchoate ambi-
tions, preferences, and ideals, with an inherited ragbag of  attitudes to different
actions, situations, and characters. You do not manage, ever, to stand apart
from all that” (1998, p. 252).
19 Henry Sidgwick made a similar point in response to Kant’s “postulates” of
practical reason: “the mere fact that I cannot act rationally without assuming
a certain proposition, does not appear to me—as it does to some minds—a
sufficient ground for believing it to be true” (1981, p. 472).
20 Obvious examples include how our beliefs about free will impact our theories
of  desserts and punishment, and how our beliefs about the (non-)existence of
an afterlife impact our beliefs about how we ought to live our lives. 
21 Assuming, of  course, that Teletransportation is reliable, cheap, etc.
22 It might be thought that Parfit’s emphasis on ideals regarded as constitutive
of  oneself  vindicates Blackburn’s belief  that questions about personal identity
must be answered from a first-person, practical standpoint. However, Parfit
can respond as follows. We each define ourselves at any given point in terms
of  certain distinctive experiences, desires, and character traits. But once this
is done, the distinctive psychological features can be understood as an exter-
nal, theoretical fact about that person, which can be measured for continuity
over time. Thomas Nagel accordingly argues that although objective or
“external” truths about mental life must originate from a subjective or “inter-
nal” perspective, they need not stay there: “What is more subjective is not nec-
essarily more private. . . . The subjective ideas of  experience, of  action, and of
the self  are in some sense public or common property” (1979, p. 207).
23 The author would like to thank Margo Adler, Oliver Sensen, Graham Forbes,
and two anonymous referees from this journal for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft.
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